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INTRODUCTION
On 6 June 2020, seven years passed since Edward Snowden commenced his revelations on
governmental misuse of surveillance capabilities (Edgar, 2017, p. 75). The impact and meaning
of his actions are still subject to vivid discussion. Snowden has recently refuelled this discourse
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with the publication of a memoir entitled Permanent Record (2019), but despite considerable
echo in the press and civil  society campaigns,  not  much seems to have changed (see e.g.,
Stoycheff et al., 2019, pp. 613-614). At first glance this is surprising since actors such as the
United Nations and the Council of Europe have undertaken several efforts to support human
rights, democracy and the rule of law in the digital age (De Hert & Papakonstantinou, 2018, pp.
526-527; Terwangne, 2014, pp. 118-119). Furthermore, the United Kingdom (UK) and South
Africa admitted bulk surveillance in court (Privacy International, 2019). Observing more closely,
however, Snowden’s activities might unintentionally have catalysed a process which leads to
more fragmentation of the digital space.
In a section entitled ‘The dark side of hope’ in his 2018 book on the culture of surveillance,
David Lyon describes the ex-employee of a contractor of the United States National Security
Agency (NSA) as a thoughtful technical expert, who believes in the potential for democratic and
human development through the internet. In addition, Lyon points out that Snowden revealed
some of the secret mechanisms contributing to creating a world in which the majority of humans
remain poor and dependent. First and foremost, underlying Snowden’s revelations is the fact
that ‘today’s surveillance undoubtedly contributes to and facilitates this world’ (Lyon, 2018, p.
143). From this perspective, it is not surprising that many societies and states choose to reduce
exposure of ‘their’ data to a multilateral setting with complex and hard-to-control implications.
Rather, they shift the focus onto immediate political and economic interests. This is probably
not the reaction that Snowden and his supporters might have hoped for, since it will most likely
not result in more protection for human rights in the short term. However, it is the easiest
answer to a myriad of complex questions.
The  motives  of  states  vary  as  they  engage  in  this  process  of  reassurance.  Some focus  on
strengthening internal security and stability, which typically takes the form of creating legal
frameworks with the objective to facilitate access to personal data for law enforcement agencies.
Concrete examples are the e-evidence package of the European Union (EU), or the United
States’ Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act). Whereas e-evidence tries to
make investigations across EU member states easier by removing the requirement for review by
local national authorities as ‘middlemen’ (Buono, 2019, pp. 307-312), the CLOUD Act enables
the US administration to sign agreements with states like the UK and Australia to make cross-
border  data  access  quicker  and easier  (Galbraith,  2020,  pp.  124-128).  Both  of  these  legal
frameworks aim at circumventing the complex and time consuming mutual legal assistance
procedures enshrined in traditional international mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) (see
also Vazquez Maymir, 2020, this issue).
Other countries have started to focus increasingly on maintaining external security and national
sovereignty.  For example,  the Russian Federation has enacted regulation to strengthen the
autonomy of the Russian part of the internet (Sherwin, 2019), which follows an earlier law
requiring that servers containing personal data of Russian citizens must be located on state
territory (Anishchuk, 2014). If one reacts sceptically to this type of decisions, one should take
into account that discussions on ‘digital sovereignty’ are not only taking place in seemingly
‘inward looking’ countries, but also seemingly in ‘open-minded’ ones such as Germany (Fox,
2018;  Gräf  et  al.,  2018).  At  the  same time,  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  seems not  to
distinguish between political and economic power, and pursues regulation that also limits the
international exchange of economic data flows (Yang, 2019).
These observations create the impression that the interest in investing in further development of
a multi-stakeholder mechanism for internet governance is limited. This mechanism gathers
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states/governments,  the  private  sector,  civil  society,  intergovernmental  organisations,
international private organisations, as well as the academic and technical communities to shape
the global internet through interactive discourse (Hill, 2014, p. 29). Organisations such as the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the Internet Governance
Forum (IGF), or the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) take prominent roles in this
process.  They  differ  considerably  when  it  comes  to  democratic  anchorage,  legitimacy,
representation,  as  well  as  regulatory  authority,  which  results  in  undeniable  tension  with
institutions  of  traditional  governance.  While  some  national  administrations  fear  loss  of
sovereignty, several groups of civil society feel under- or non-represented (Ewert et al., 2020).
Hence, the decentralised and universal nature of the internet, which are both paradigms that the
multi-stakeholder mechanism traditionally supports (Hill, 2014, pp. 16-46), has become subject
to scrutiny. Scholars such as O’Hara and Hall argue that there are already four internets: a
heavily regulated European ‘bourgeois’ version that prides itself on its dedication to human
rights and ethics; the US version with its strong focus on monetisation and economic activity;
the authoritarian internet of China where social cohesion and surveillance mean the same thing;
and the internet of misinformation and hacking associated with the Russian Federation, North
Korea and other ‘rogue states’ (O’Hara & Hall, 2018).
If anything, this makes it clear that the nature of the internet is still developing. Since John
Perry Barlow published the ‘Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’ (1996) the digital
sphere  has  evolved  considerably.  The  internet  has  become  an  important  layer  of  social
interaction which also means it has become more than a mere passage for data flows. While the
idea to regulate it in a similar way to what Hugo Grotius suggested for the High Seas in 1608
seems appealing (Hildebrandt, 2013, p. 211) - particularly to those primarily concerned about
the free passage of data packages - the technical infrastructure that constitutes the internet
cannot be qualified as res nullius. In contrast to the High Seas, the internet does not lend itself
neutrally to any kind of activity. In this context, Melvin Kranzberg’s first law is not the only
thing that comes to mind (‘technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral’ (Kranzberg,
1995, p. 5)). As inhabitants of industrialised and more developed countries face the looming
threat of being replaced by ‘superintelligent’ autonomous machines (West, 2018, pp. 19-41), the
rushed and under-reflected adoption of ‘digital identities’ might further widen the inequality gap
with less-developed areas of the world (Gstrein & Kochenov, 2020). Hence, as the rapid mass-
adoption of information technology and autonomous systems continues, this urgent question
emerges: is it possible to create a trustworthy and universal digital space, based on human rights
principles  and  values,  which  might  be  able  to  prevent  a  dystopian  future  with  limited
opportunities for information exchange and undignified data-driven economies whose purpose
is to fuel fantasies of political hegemony?
The objective of this article is to identify potentially useful regulatory strategies that at least
mitigate or avoid (further) balkanisation/fragmentation of the digital space. This process of
fragmentation  has  also  been  described  as  movement  towards  a  ‘splinternet’.  Once  it  is
completed, the remaining digital information networks will have turned away from the three
central principles of openness in terms of universal cross-border data transfer, trust in terms of
faith  in  other  users,  and  decentralisation  which  supports  resilience  and  freedom
(Ananthaswamy, 2011, p. 42). The lens through which the regulatory strategies will be identified
is government-led surveillance as defined in the Methodology section. After analysis of two
proposals  for  the  regulation  of  government-led  surveillance  from  a  universal  perspective,
available strategies to manage power and jurisdiction on the internet will be discussed. At the
end of this exercise it will be concluded whether regulatory frameworks that respect, protect and
promote the internet as one global space are feasible under current circumstances.
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METHODOLOGY
Before starting to map out salient issues, a few brief remarks on the selection of proposals and
the  methodology  of  this  submission are  necessary.  The  topic  of  surveillance  is  immensely
complex with much historic context to consider (Galič et al., 2017). Additionally, surveillance as
a phenomenon is not only purely government-driven. Much has been written about the profiling
of individuals for commercial gain, the impact of ‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff, 2019) on
individual and collective autonomy, and how new technologies such as artificial intelligence
influence democracy and the formation of the public (Nemitz, 2018). Other scholars propose the
consideration of surveillance ‘as cultural imaginaries and practices’ which makes surveillance a
subject of everyday life (Lyon, 2018, p. 127).
While these are valid approaches, this submission will predominantly leave out major corporate
and non-government related aspects. For this piece the term ‘surveillance’ is defined as ‘any
monitoring or observing of persons, listening to their conversations or other activities, or any
other collection of data referring to persons regardless whether this is content data or metadata’;
furthermore, government-led is to be interpreted as ‘surveillance [that] is carried out by a state,
or on its  behalf,  or  at  its  order’  (Cannataci,  2018a,  p.  9).  These definitions emphasise the
relationship between the citizen/resident and the state, which is typical for international human
rights law. Furthermore, this concentration makes the topic more manageable in volume, and
allows distilling the essence of available regulatory strategies. However, this does not suggest
that  regulation  is  all  that  is  required  to  create  a  trustworthy  and  universal  digital  space.
Furthermore,  applying  government-led  surveillance  as  a  lens  with  its  focus  on  states  and
individuals does not mean that the actions of corporations are entirely irrelevant. As supporters
or  enablers  of  state  surveillance  -  which has  been claimed to  reach structural  dimensions
embedded in the telecommunications infrastructure of powerful western actors (Gallagher &
Moltke, 2018) - their actions remain relevant. The United Nations stressed such responsibility in
a General Assembly resolution on privacy in the digital age on 14 November 2018 (2018, pp. 6-
7).
In this setting focused on regulatory frameworks for government-led surveillance, the available
regulatory strategies are explored on the basis of two recent proposals which attempt to address
the  issues  on  universal  level:  The  ‘Working  Draft  Legal  Instrument  on  Government-led
Surveillance and Privacy’  (‘LI’)  (Cannataci,  2018a) which has been presented to the United
Nations  Human  Rights  Council  in  March  2018,  and  the  proposal  for  a  ‘Digital  Geneva
Convention’ (DGC) presented by one of Microsoft’s presidents Brad Smith (2017).
GENERAL NATURE OF THE PROPOSALS
Both  proposals  are  based  on  the  premise  that  the  internet  is  an  independent  and
universal/global space which should be accessible and open to all individuals on the planet
regardless of where they come from. By emphasising this enabling and empowering dimension
from an individual perspective, the proposals call on states to overhaul the international legal
framework in order to address government-led surveillance in more detail and more effectively
(Cannataci, 2018b, p. 22; Smith, 2017). Smith starts with the observation that cyber-attacks,
cyber-espionage and cyber-warfare have become widespread and dangerous (see also Thumfart,
2020).  Since  many  of  these  are  directly  or  indirectly  led  by  state  powers  that  carry  out
Mapping power and jurisdiction on the internet through the lens of government-led
surveillance
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 5 September 2020 | Volume 9 | Issue 3
surveillance, he proposes to address this new reality with the development of a DGC to protect
private citizens and entities, or in other words ‘non-combatants’ (Smith, 2017). His proposal
relates to the Fourth Geneva Convention for the protection of civilians in warfare from 1949
(Mansell & Openshaw, 2010, p. 23). Since the appropriateness, effectiveness, and timeliness of
the Geneva Conventions of  1949 is  being questioned due to  the emergence of  asymmetric
warfare and international  terrorism in today’s  conflict  scenarios  (Gordon 2010,  pp.  95-96;
Ratner, 2008), it might be surprising to see such a concrete demand spearheaded by one of the
presidents  of  one  of  the  most  influential  technology  corporations.  Smith  (2017)  suggests
enshrining six principles in a novel instrument of public international law: (1) No targeting of
tech companies,  private sector  or  critical  infrastructure;  (2)  Assist  private sector  efforts  to
detect, contain, respond to, and recover from events; (3) Report vulnerabilities to vendors rather
than to stockpile, sell or exploit them; (4) Exercise restraint in developing cyber weapons and
ensure that  they only allow for limited and precise use;  Additionally,  they should be non-
reusable; (5) Commit to non-proliferation activities relating to cyberweapons; and (6) Limit
offensive operation to avoid a mass event. In terms of impact, the DGC has not gained traction
within the community of states at the time of writing. However, it was followed up with the
signing of a ‘Cybersecurity Tech Accord’  by 34 technology and security companies in 2018
(Smith, 2018).
The  principles  of  the  DGC have  to  be  evaluated  critically,  keeping  in  mind that  Smith  is
associated with a corporation that has strong relationships with some of the most powerful
states. On the one hand, this scepticism vis-à-vis Smith’s intention was recently supported with
the award of a US$ 10 billion contract by the United States Pentagon which allows Microsoft to
provide an advanced cloud infrastructure for the United States Army that might also be used for
surveillance (Conger et al., 2019). On the other hand, when focusing on the substance of his
proposal one can also discover aspects that support openness, trust and decentralisation of the
internet by making the internet less dependent on traditional governance mechanisms and
institutions. Hence, the DGC is potentially able to support the creation of a digital space which is
universal and safe(r) for its users. For example, the United States NSA recently shared the
discovery of a major security vulnerability in Windows systems that could have facilitated large
scale surveillance if kept secret (Newman, 2020). In this sense the agency delivered on the
demands enshrined in principles two and three of  the DGC. Furthermore,  it  seems fair  to
assume that corporations focus predominantly on the relationship with their users/clients who
do not only consist of governments. Their business opportunities increase with the ability to act
in  stable  and  universal  legal  frameworks  across  the  globe,  independent  from  territorial
restraints. This also means there is an interest in having checks and balances that control public
institutions  as  they  carry  out  surveillance,  since  the  independence of  the  private  sector  is
strengthened. This also means that aspects like citizenship or residency do not matter as much
for corporations as they do for states, and in traditional human rights/civil liberties law when it
comes to applicability and enforcement (Nowak, 2018, pp. 273-275).
Smith’s proposal is based on a perspective where technology corporations are independent and
neutral  actors  which  promote  the  internet  as  a  universally  accessible  layer  of  societal
interaction.  Whether  this  is  a  sincere,  desirable  or  achievable  objective  can  remain  for
speculation. Regardless, the DGC as a blueprint for a regulatory instrument in itself is a worthy
object of study for the purposes of this article. While Smith and Microsoft’s intentions might be
more or less motivated by economic short-term gains in their day-to-day business, the DGC can
be scrutinised as a self-standing set of principles that has its own strengths and weaknesses,
which will be outlined below.
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Although the DGC and the LI have the common goal of catalysing the evolution of international
public law to achieve regulation of government-led surveillance, the process in which the LI
emerged differs significantly. In its essence it is a co-production of an EU funded research
project (MAPPING i.e. Managing Alternatives for Privacy, Property and Internet Governance)
and the initiative of the inaugural UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy Joseph A.
Cannataci  (2018a,  p.  3).  The  text  itself,  which  is  a  sort-of  blueprint  for  an  international
agreement between states, is based on earlier surveillance-related research carried out in other
EU funded projects.  Those  insights  were  combined in  a  first  draft  with  international  and
European human rights law principles, such as those enshrined in the International Covenant
on Civil  and Political  Rights  of  the United Nations (ICCPR),  the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFEU). Furthermore,
developments in the modernisation of the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108; updated by
protocol CETS No. 223 on 10 October 2018 to become Convention 108+) as well as the EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) were included. Finally, the findings of landmark
judgments of national courts, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) were also taken into consideration.
Although international human rights law standards of the UN such as Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights or Article 17 of the ICCPR underpin the provisions of the LI as
well,  one  might  criticise  this  heavy  influence  of  European  standards,  regulation,  and
jurisprudence on a proposal that was developed to potentially become the basis for a global
regulatory framework. Nevertheless, the initial idea for this project was to start with a relatively
concrete and substantive text that would allow the mapping of salient issues in this area, as well
as  creating  the  ability  for  concrete  discussions  about  them.  Furthermore,  international
comparative  research  on  the  development  of  data  protection  and  privacy  law  shows  that
European standards have heavily  influenced regulation in those 142 states which did have
specific privacy-related regulation at the end of 2019, the majority of which are located outside
the EU, the territories of Council of Europe member states, and the United States. Additionally,
the relevance of European activity is underlined by the fact that the number of specific laws
across the world has risen significantly following the attention that the GDPR and Convention
108+ have received (Greenleaf & Cottier, 2020, pp. 24-26).
The final published version of the LI consists of 18 articles accompanied by explanatory remarks
(‘memorandum’). Before the LI was presented to the Human Rights Council in March 2018 it
went through a process of thirteen substantive iterations which were based on feedback received
in ten meetings carried out in different locations in Europe and the United States from April
2016 to February 2018, as well as written submissions and verbal feedback (Cannataci, 2018a,
pp.  1,  38).  This  feedback  was  sourced  from  a  multi-stakeholder  community  consisting  of
corporations, members of the law enforcement and intelligence community, members of civil
society organisations, academics and other experts on the topic of government-led surveillance
(Cannataci, 2018a, p. 2).
SALIENT ISSUES
Due to the limited amount of space in this article it is not possible to discuss the proposals in
their entire breadth and depth. Furthermore, rather than considering them as detailed and
sufficient solutions for the complex issue, it might be more appropriate to use them as indicators
(or ‘maps’) which together might be capable of highlighting why it is so difficult to regulate
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government-led surveillance. The proposals are probably best understood as attempts to reveal
the substantive issues which should be resolved in order to establish the basis for progress.
Although some may claim that it is unlikely that global consensus on these matters is achieved
at all given the relevance of cultural differences across and within regions (Vecellio & Segate,
2019, pp. 83-88), it is precisely this audacious aspiration of becoming the basis for a discussion
on detailed universal standards which bears the potential to highlight links, gaps and frictions.
WHAT IS (MASS-)SURVEILLANCE?
Probably  the  most  discussed  issue  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Snowden  revelations  is  what
government-led (mass-)surveillance is, could be, and should be (Buono & Taylor, 2017). The use
of  ‘Big  Data’  to  support  national  security,  law enforcement  and the  public  order  requires
adjusted and new safeguards to protect individuals and their rights (Broeders et al., 2017, pp.
311-321).  The  DGC  principles  do  not  explicitly  provide  a  conceptual  definition  of  mass-
surveillance.  Reading  principles  one,  three,  four,  five  and  six  together  and  attempting  to
combine  their  content  in  one  statement,  surveillance  seems  to  be  based  on  the  use  of
cyberweapons which exploit security vulnerabilities. Furthermore, cyberweapons should not be
used to target the private sector, and their use results potentially in mass events.
Article 2 paragraph 1 of the LI defines surveillance as ‘any monitoring or observing of persons,
listening to their conversations or other activities, or any other collection of data referring to
persons regardless whether this is content data or metadata.’ It goes on to add that ‘surveillance
is carried out by a state, or on its behalf, or at its order’ (Cannataci, 2018a, p. 9). To understand
this  broad  definition  better  it  should  be  added  that  the  LI  uses  a  distinction  between
‘surveillance data’ and ‘non-surveillance data’ which stems from the understanding that data is
produced  either  by  systems that  are  predominantly  operated  to  carry  out  surveillance,  or
systems which have another primary purpose. The obligations stemming from the use of these
different kinds of data differ in the LI, and it remains open whether it is always possible to make
such a categorical distinction in practice. There might be cases in which repurposing historical
surveillance data or reinterpretation/-combination of openly available data with confidential
data are not covered by the provisions of the LI. Potentially, it is too strongly focused on the
generation  and initial  processing  of  data,  therefore  underestimating  the  amount  of  usable
information already available. In this regard, it might also be interesting to consider how the
trend towards open source intelligence (OSINT) impacts the work of states when carrying out
surveillance (Hassan & Hijazi 2018, pp. 341-345).
Article 3 paragraph 6 exempts the surveillance of military personnel from the scope of the LI.
Hence, this is the only area in which the LI does not mandate that states create a dedicated law
for  the  authorisation  of  surveillance  which  also  comes  with  the  obligation  to  install
corresponding oversight institutions, safeguards, and remedies (Cannataci, 2018a, pp. 9, 11). An
important consequence of this exemption is that all other surveillance activities - those carried
out  within a  state  through law enforcement agencies,  those carried out  externally  through
security  and intelligence services,  as  well  as  those carried out  through (private)  mandated
entities working in both domains - are subject to the same principles and rules according to the
LI.
This very broad definition of surveillance covers many activities, which makes a clear distinction
between ‘targeted’ and ‘mass’/‘bulk’ surveillance potentially less relevant. Indeed, it might be
more useful to focus the discussion on the concept of surveillance as such, since the emphasis of
‘bulk’ or ‘mass’ capabilities often seems to add little in substance. Ultimately, such narrowing of
the focus could transform the public dialogue into a mock debate that is predominantly held to
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capture attention. Especially when considering the rich case law encapsulated in the ECtHR’s
factsheet on ‘mass surveillance’ (2019), it needs instead to be decided on a case-by-case basis
whether any kind of surveillance is legitimate (i.e. proportionate and necessary). The relevant
substantive criteria to decide whether ‘bulk surveillance’ measures are compliant with human
rights law also need to be as strict and coherent as for targeted surveillance measures.
SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE
While it has already been established that both proposals transcend territorial borders - which
might  support  making  progress  on  otherwise  very  complex  problems  relating  to  data
localisation  and  differing  regulatory  requirements  due  to  incompatible  standards  and
fragmentation as highlighted in particular through the CJEU Schrems case (Kuner, 2017, pp.
917-918) - this feature in turn results in the requirement to define the substantive scope of the
instruments more granularly.  Since the kind of  actions they target is  less clear,  it  is  more
important to define them in principle. Smith’s DGC attempts to resolve this issue by embedding
the proposal in a description or narrative of a constantly ongoing hostile conflict in the digital
domain,  which  results  in  a  predominantly  negative  and  almost  implicit  definition  of  the
substantive  scope.  This  comes with the consequence that  one has to  share the underlying
assumptions and worldview of Smith before being able to substantively engage with the content.
If  one  were  to  define  the  substantive  scope  positively  however,  there  are  at  least  two
perspectives which need to be taken into account:  the individual/user perspective,  and the
perspective  of  the  collective/regulatory  institutions.  When  it  comes  to  the  user,  French
sociologist Frédéric Martel (2014, Épilogue) has made the valid argument that even in times of
globalisation,  users  with  different  cultural  backgrounds  will  continue  to  use  the  internet
differently, depending on factors such as shared language, shared script, cultural perception,
personal interest, etc. From the outset, this has nothing to do with interconnected infrastructure
or technological features. Rather, it is the digital expression of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous
quote: ‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my world’ (1974, p. 68). In other words, one
can  complain  about  the  fact  that  the  government  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  puts
technical restrictions in place which make it very difficult for its citizens and residents to access
censored content from abroad. However, if one were to do so one also has to be consistent to
only complain on behalf of those who are able to read the Latin alphabet and have a sufficient
command of English, for example. It is very difficult to establish who truly feels limited in one’s
personal development (Wang & Mark, 2015, pp. 19-20). Certainly, limiting technical capabilities
and putting policies in place that aim at restricting the interests of those who crave for accessing
censored content will  hamper the existence of  a  truly universal  and global  internet.  Yet  it
remains uncertain how many users are genuinely interested in using such a network, at least for
a significant amount of time, or when it seems reasonable to expect so.
Turning to  the  institutional/regulatory  perspective  the  issue  does  not  get  much easier.  As
technology is constantly evolving, it makes a difference if the substantive scope is defined as
either  the  ‘internet’  or  the  ‘digital  domain’,  which  might  for  example  also  include  digital
information that is not being transferred through use of internet protocol addresses. One could
think  of  the  transfer  of  digital  data  using  technologies  such  as  Bluetooth,  or  Near-field
Communication (NFC). In Article 1 sentence 1, the LI relates to ‘surveillance through digital
technology’  (Cannataci,  2018a,  p.  7)  which means it  adopts  a  relatively  broad scope.  This
wording is the result of an attempt to align the substantive scope with the mandate of the SRP
that is tied to the UN’s work on human rights in the digital age (Cannataci, 2018a, p. 8). Still,
one has to question if this substantive scope is precise enough for an instrument that attempts to
be of global relevance and have a cross-cultural dimension. Another practical issue that might be
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interesting to consider in the context of government-led surveillance is the question of what
should happen if  ‘traditional surveillance’  using non-digital means is combined with digital
surveillance during a surveillance operation. In such situations it might even be relevant to have
universal standards for both the digital and non-digital domains.
NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE
Even strong proponents of individual autonomy, privacy and data protection will agree that
some form of government-led surveillance is  necessary under limited circumstances,  which
typically include ‘the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of crime […] increasing
public safety or protecting state security’ as stated in Article 3 paragraph 3 LI (Cannataci, 2018a,
p. 11). It is worthwhile comparing this provision with Article 8 paragraph 2 ECHR where it is
stated that the right to respect for private and family life may be limited if it ‘[…] is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’ (emphasis added). Hence, the
LI  contains  fewer  objectives  that  legitimise  surveillance,  and notably  does  not  include the
economic well-being of the state. In the LI’s memorandum this is explained by stating that
governments  may  legislate  to  punish  corresponding  criminal  offences  with  an  impact  on
economic well-being if such crimes are serious enough (Cannataci, 2018a, p. 14).
While this discussion on the legitimate objectives making surveillance necessary is interesting,
more public attention was dedicated to the proportionality of  surveillance measures in the
aftermath of Edward Snowden’s revelations. As one of the leading US civil society organisations
the  Electronic  Frontier  Foundation  has  developed  13  principles  aimed  at  ensuring
proportionality. These include judicial authority, due process, user notification, transparency,
oversight, and others (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2015). While the formulation of such
general  principles  seems  helpful,  this  might  be  one  area  where  a  much  more  granular
understanding of the terms is needed. Although proportionality is a concept that is used often in
international public law, there seems to be very little shared understanding of what it means
objectively (Newton and May, 2014, pp. 28-32). The LI makes an attempt in this direction by
proposing a three-step test in the preamble in paragraph 5 (general usefulness of the measure
for  the  purpose;  least  invasive  measure  available  used;  proportionality  stricto  sensu,  or
considering what needs to be sacrificed/affected if feasible and least invasive measure is applied
(Cannataci, 2018a, p. 3)).
In contrast, the proposal for a DGC only seems to touch upon this issue by requiring the targeted
use of cyberweapons as well as restraint in their development (Smith, 2017). Remaining neutral
on which kind of test is ‘the right one’ to resolve this issue, these considerations highlight that it
is paramount to explore what the terms necessary and proportionate objectively/universally
mean if any kind of international regulatory framework for this area should be developed. If it is
impossible to reach such a detailed understanding through the establishment of clear definitions
and detailed procedures, at least an institution needs to be appointed which has the authority to
decide this on a case by case basis.
TRANSBORDER ACCESS TO PERSONAL DATA
Since both instruments have a universal scope it is particularly interesting to see how they
address the question of transborder access to data. This issue was recently highlighted through
the Microsoft Ireland case which developed after the United States government attempted to
access data stored on a server located in Ireland, bypassing the use of lengthy traditional mutual
legal  assistance  arrangements.  Hence,  Smith’s  corporation  was  at  the  centre  of  the  issue,
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although a similar case was also pending against Google at the time (Currie, 2017). Before the
US Supreme Court decided the case, the situation was resolved by the US legislator with the
introduction of the CLOUD Act (Daskal, 2018). Smith proposes in the DGC that technology
companies remain neutral in this regard, solely focusing on the relationship with their users
(Smith,  2017).  Whether Microsoft  and other technology corporations truly lived up to this
principle during discussion of the CLOUD Act is very questionable however, since Microsoft,
Google and others supported the legislation when it was discussed in the United States Congress
(Brody,  2018).  Furthermore,  the DGC does not explicitly  address the issue of  cross-border
access. Hence, the pledge for neutrality remains abstract and weak. In the end, the DGC is set in
a  landscape where  government  activities  are  omnipresent  in  the  digital  domain,  and high
information security standards would allow individuals to enjoy more privacy, regardless of
where their data is physically located in the world.
The LI  has  a  whole  provision relating to  this  issue in  Article  16.  It  is  envisioned that  its
signatories  would  set  up  a  new  international  institution  consisting  of  experts  from  all
participating states which would also monitor the implementation of the LI more generally.
These experts would have the capacity to respond to cross-border demands in a swift manner
and in procedures where the individuals affected would be represented by a ‘Human Rights
Defender’ (Cannataci, 2018, pp. 32-35). While the establishment of this institution is compelling
due to its completeness and potential to deliver a valid multilateral solution for the cross-border
access problem, it remains highly doubtful whether states would be willing to transfer that much
sovereign power to an international body whose actions would have significant implications for
the success  of  criminal  investigations,  and potentially  intelligence service  activities.  As  the
discussion within the EU about the e-evidence package shows, even in a structured regional
cooperation bloc the establishment of such a central authority is not envisaged, and many gaps
and issues remain to be resolved (Biasotti et al., 2018, pp. 375-420).
STRATEGIES FOR REGULATION
While the presented proposals are commendable in that they aim at supporting the ideal of the
internet as a universal space dedicated to personal autonomy and individual development, the
previous section makes clear that this requires much more detailed substantive understanding
of key terms and concepts among the international community. While the LI is certainly more
comprehensive and detailed than the DGC, it struggles to set a clear substantive scope, define
the subject matter, and deliver solutions on the understanding of terms such as ‘necessary and
proportionate’. Key topics such as transborder access to personal data are addressed, but the
whole document can only claim to be a modest step towards (more) international consensus.
Hence,  before  universal  regulation  through  institutions  like  the  UN  seems  realistic,  more
detailed understanding and broad agreement on the substantive issues is required. To enable
more progress on the UN level, De Hert and Papakonstantinou (2018, pp. 529-531) suggested
creating a privacy-dedicated agency which could work in a similar way to the World Intellectual
Property Organisation. However, this seems politically almost impossible to achieve under the
current circumstances which have been outlined in the introduction. Furthermore, attempts of
the UN to have more control over the internet have failed in the recent past. Just before the
Snowden revelations the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) was used as a vessel for
an attempt to replace the open multi-stakeholder mechanism with an open or closed model of
traditional multilateral governance focused on states. During negotiations in the context of the
2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications this attempt was blocked by a
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coalition led by western countries, mainly due to concerns that repressive regimes might gain
too much control over the internet (Glen, 2014, pp. 643-652). Finally, there might also be valid
factual reasons to have different standards and concepts as Martel’s research highlights, with its
focus on the user perspective (2014, Épilogue). Maybe the idea of a borderless internet-driven
world was, and remains, an illusion, as Goldsmith and Wu (2006) already proposed more than
15 years ago, emphasising the role of governments and the many layers that enable the existence
of the digital space.
Nevertheless,  assuming for a moment that there could be more substantive consensus,  the
crucial question of effective enforcement also remains largely unanswered in the proposals. The
DGC does not address this aspect in detail and mostly calls for states to refrain from certain
actions, while the LI develops in Article 16 a perspective on oversight of its provisions through
the establishment of a powerful international body operating in a centralised manner. How
delicate such an attempt of attribution and redistribution of sovereign power can become can be
studied by following the ongoing discussion on the ‘rule of law’ in the EU (Weiler, 2016, pp. 313-
326).  Furthermore, the German civil  society organisation Stiftung Neue Verantwortung has
recently  presented  recommendations  to  improve  intelligence  oversight  (Vieth  &  Wetzling,
2019), which is another important element to guarantee individuals’ rights and freedoms of
individuals.
Hence, it seems that at the time of writing universal regulation of government-led surveillance is
predominantly  an academic  (idealistic?;  utopian?)  endeavour.  It  is  worthwhile  to  map the
current landscape to potentially pave the way for progress, but due to the complexity of the issue
it is unrealistic as a practical solution. States and regional political actors instead seem to prefer
to use traditional assets and strategies to shape the internet and claim jurisdiction and power.
Furthermore, restrictions about the use of the Android operating system for companies like
Huawei (Afhüppe & Scheuer, 2019), or the struggle to establish trust in the deployment of 5G
mobile networks suggest that this is not about to change in the near future (Matsumoto, 2019;
see also Cartwright, 2020).
What other alternatives are there, leaving aside the re-territorialisation of the internet which
threatens to fragment it? Is it possible to regulate topics such as government-led surveillance
with strategies not using extraterritorial effect, or the reinforcement of physical borders? Such a
third-way between universal frameworks and national regulation might be the establishment of
‘blocs of trust’. One international agreement employing this strategy is Convention 108+ of the
Council of Europe, another one the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. These international
treaties allow for a traditional harmonisation of national laws, while being open to non-member
states of the Council by either acceding to them or implementing their principles in national
regulation autonomously (Ukrow, 2018; Polakiewicz, 2019). Additionally, their provisions entail
many useful and detailed principles, but are drafted in a way that avoids too much regulatory
detail, respecting the sovereignty of states.
It is unclear how successful this strategy can be. Therefore, it will be particularly interesting to
observe the push to establish Convention 108+ as a new global regulatory baseline for data
protection,  which  is  less  demanding  and  detailed  than  the  EU  General  Data  Protection
Regulation, but more concrete than the abstract provision on privacy in Article 17 of the ICCPR
at the UN level. Maybe the areas of data protection and privacy can become pioneers in this
regard, which could potentially inspire the regulation of surveillance as well. However, initial
research on the requirements to adapt or (re-)model data protection laws finds that it will be
difficult enough for Latin American and African countries to join the 47 member states of the
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Council of Europe by signing up to Convention 108+. For Asian countries it will be even more
difficult. South Korea and Thailand seem to have legal frameworks which are already mostly in
line with the treaty (Greenleaf, 2020). However, this is only an analysis of requirements in
terms of legal provisions, leaving aside the procedures and dynamics of political negotiation
processes, as well as the question why and how countries should develop the political will to
accede.
CONCLUSION
Developing blueprints for international instruments that might ultimately help to create a more
harmonious and detailed framework for  the regulation of  surveillance on and through the
internet  is  a  commendable  effort.  However,  in  the  absence  of  political  will  to  develop
overarching multilateral proposals on the matter, other strategies for regulation are needed.
Hence,  it  seems  that  the  only  available  alternative  to  such  an  unlikely,  truly  universal
international framework is the development of regional frameworks which are open to third
states for adoption through accession and ratification, or through modelling national laws after
such agreements. The Council of Europe has been successful in developing such texts in the past
(Gstrein, 2019, p. 89-90), but also has recently struggled to provide a productive forum for
political exchange itself (Rankin, 2019). Certainly, this approach also comes with the danger
that instead of falling back to the national level, the internet might become separated on a
regional level. Still, if none of the multilateral options gain considerable influence and develop
further, the only possible outcome is fragmentation of the digital space, which would also result
in the reversal of many achievements made in recent times.
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